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Justice Simonett, one of the great Minnesota Supreme Court 
Justices, wrote about the constraining impact of legal rules in his 




This issue of the William Mitchell Law Review presents articles 
relating to the rules governing the admissibility of evidence at trial.  
The articles address how rules impact the fairness of the trial 
process, how rules might affect behavior outside of the courtroom, 
and how rules can influence the perception of justice.  Legal rules, 
of course, put limits on the tribunal’s unfettered discretion.  They 
require judges to reflect on the policy embodied by the rule, not 
the policy preferred by the judge.  Many judges, including 
Minnesota Supreme Court justices, chafe at the restrictions 
imposed by rules and identify instead with Thomas Edison’s more 
pragmatic approach suggested in the quote above. 
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1987 to 1989.  B.A. DePauw University, J.D. University of Michigan.  Law Clerk to 
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Associate Professor at William Mitchell College of Law from 1973 to 1977.  
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 1. MICHAEL J. GELB & SARAH MILLER CALDICOTT, INNOVATE LIKE EDISON: THE 
SUCCESS SYSTEM OF AMERICA’S GREATEST INVENTOR 6 (2007). 
 2. John E. Simonett, The Use of the Term “Result-Oriented” to Characterize 
Appellate Decisions, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187 (1984). 
  Following legal rules requires that judges and justices 
subordinate their values and preferences for the values expressed 
in the rule.  Of course he recognized the vital role legal rules 
played in limiting ad hoc decision making in our democratic 
government.  Justice Simonett, quoting Alexander Hamilton, 
stated, “[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts . . . it is 
indispensible that they should be bound down by strict rules and 
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precedent, which serve to define and point out their duty in every 
particular case that comes before them.”3  Nonetheless, Justice 
Simonett argued that judges should not slavishly enforce rules; 
rules need to be applied with some flexibility, or as he phrases it, 
with “elasticity.”4
Minnesota Courts followed common law rules of evidence 
until July 1, 1977, the effective date of the Minnesota Rules of 
Evidence.  The process of developing Minnesota’s first evidentiary 
code took three years.  Chief Justice Sheran first convened the 
Advisory Committee in 1974.  He instructed the committee to 
consider the newly enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as a model 
and to propose a rule that deviated from the federal rule only 
where a significant state policy conflicted with the federal 
approach.
  Flexibility and elasticity seem apt descriptions for 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s approach to applying rules of 
evidence. 
5  After two years of monthly meetings and two public 
hearings the committee sent a recommendation to the court.  The 
rules were promulgated by the court consistent with Minnesota 
Statutes section 480.0591 (1974).6
The implementation of the new evidence rules appeared to 
cause very few problems in Minnesota trial practice.  It was not 
until eleven years later that the Advisory Committee was 
reconvened to consider amendments.
  The committee followed the 
direction of the chief justice.  The promulgated rules were quite 




 3. Id. at 201 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
 4. Id. at 203. 
 5. See generally PETER N. THOMPSON, 11 MINN. PRAC. EVIDENCE § 101.01 (3d 
ed. 2001) (describing the history of the development of the Minnesota Rules of 
Evidence). 
 6. Id.  See also MINN. STAT. § 480.0591 (2008). 
 7. See Order Appointing Members to Supreme Court Advisory Committee 
on Rules of Evidence 1, 1 (1988) available at http://www.mncourts.gov/ 
Documents/0/Public/administration/AdministrationFiles/Rules%20of%20Evide
nce%20C3-84-2138/1988%20Rls%20of%20Evid%20Appt%20Orders.pdf. 
  The main concern then was 
to make the rules gender neutral.  A few amendments were 
implemented with minor changes—adding gender-neutral 
language and modifying the rules to conform to judicial decisions.  
The rules were not reviewed or amended again for another decade.  
Remarkably, the Minnesota Rules of Evidence have been amended 
only twice in the past thirty years. 
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As a participant on each advisory committee that 
recommended the rules to the court, I like to think that the rules 
were well crafted with nuanced attention to the culture and sound 
practices in Minnesota courts, and that, of course, they are 
acceptable and workable rules.  I actually believe this is a fair 
conclusion based on my conversations with trial judges throughout 
the state.  Once every dozen years, then, is sufficient to review the 
text of the rules.  On the other hand, after years of reading 
Minnesota Supreme Court decisions, a second possibility has 
begrudgingly crept into my consciousness.  The rules of evidence 
that I have devoted a career to teaching, drafting and chronicling 
really do not matter that much to the Minnesota Supreme Court.  
Elasticity and flexibility, not textual or policy analysis, are the 
linchpins of evidence law in the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
The shift from common law rules to codified rules based on 
federal standards meant that the Minnesota Supreme Court was 
supposed to relinquish its central role in controlling the values and 
policies embedded in the rules of evidence in deference to advisory 
committees and federal authorities.  Giving up power is a difficult 
thing to do.   
The Minnesota Supreme Court in its order of promulgation8 
reserved the right to modify, supersede, or otherwise amplify 
specific rules of evidence in its decisions without resorting to 
administrative rulemaking procedures.  Instead, the supreme court 
has largely ignored the rules of evidence,9
 
 8. See Order Promulgating the Rules of Evidence (Minn. Apr. 1, 1977), 
reprinted in 50 MINN. STAT. ANN. VII–VIII (West 1980), cited in Goeb v. Tharaldson, 
615 N.W.2d 800, 813 (Minn. 2000)). 
 9. See THOMPSON, supra note 5, §301.03 (stating “[t]he adoption of Rule 301 
[presumptions] has had little impact on the law of presumption in Minnesota.  
The rule is rarely cited by the appellate courts and has yet to be carefully analyzed 
by the Minnesota Supreme Court.  Even after the adoption of Rule 301, courts 
continue to use the term presumption to refer to substantive rules of law and 
resolve presumption issues on an ad hoc case by case, presumption by 
presumption approach.”).  See also George v. Estate of Baker, 724 N.W.2d 1, 12–13 
(Minn. 2006) (finding it proper to take judicial notice of American mortality 
tables but not Liberian mortality information from the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 
without referring to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 201). 
 or at best it treats the 
rules as general standards that do not really constrain judicial 
decision making, but set wide parameters for judicial discretion.  
The rules are like traffic signs on the highway.  These signs are to 
be carefully followed by those unsure of how to get to a destination.  
They may be ignored, however, by those with a keen sense of where 
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they are going and believe they know a shortcut. 
For the most part, however, the process seems to be working 
tolerably well.  The evidence rules were based on common law 
principles gleaned from the court’s past decisions.  They embody 
the longstanding view in Minnesota and elsewhere that the 
decisions whether to admit or exclude evidence should be 
committed to trial court discretion.  So, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s decisions, which are usually based on sound common law 
judgment, do not often directly conflict with the text and policy 
behind the rule.  In these cases where the court’s judgment squares 
with the text of the rules, the rules are helpful to the court in 
explaining its decisions.10
Contrast the state experience with the history of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. When addressing evidence issues the federal 
courts tend to focus carefully on the text and policy behind the 
evidence rule.  The Federal Rules of Evidence are enacted by 
statute, which perhaps justifies a different approach in 
construction.
  But clearly the text or policy behind the 
evidence rules is not a starting point in the court’s consideration. 
11  Involving the legislature in the process may also 
politicize the rules and the rulemaking process.12
 
 10. For example, Rule 403 is frequently cited by the court as justification for 
affirming the trial judge’s admission of evidence.  See generally James A. Morrow et 
al., Weighing Spreigl Evidence: In Search of a Standard, 60 BENCH & B. OF MINN. 23 
(Nov. 2003).  Rarely has Rule 403 been carefully analyzed.  Id. 
 11. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond “Top Down” Grand 
Theories of Statutory Construction: A “Bottom Up” Interpretive Approach to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 75 OR. L. REV. 389, 395–96 (1966) (arguing for a textual 
approach to interpreting the rules of evidence); Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the 
Federal Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee Notes, 28 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1283 (1995) (arguing the court should rely on the Advisory 
Committee Notes in construing the rules of evidence); Andrew E. Taslitz, 
Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a Politically Realistic 
Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329, 399 (1995) (calling for the court to be 
more candid in identifying the basis for construing the rules of evidence, 
recognizing the limitation of linguistics as an interpretive technique); Glen 
Wassenberger, Evidence Myopia: The Failure to See the Federal Rules of Evidence as a 
Codification of the Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1539 (1999) (advocating 
that the rules should be construed from an historical perspective as a codification 
of common law). 
 12. See generally Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence] 
Rulemaking,” 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (2002) (providing a history of the federal rules 
of evidence and discussing symposia articles on the topic of the Politics of 
[Evidence] Rulemaking). 
  The Federal 
Rules of Evidence are in a constant state of reexamination and 
amendment.  But where the text of the rules matters in federal 
4
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courts, in Minnesota the text and underlying policy of the rule 
provide only a general standard that may or may not guide the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in the resolution of an issue. 
The treatment of expert testimony presents a prime example 
of the contrasting approach to construing rules by the United 
States Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court. In the 
now famous United States Supreme Court decision Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,13 the United States Supreme Court 
strained to draw the workings of the new federal approach to 
expert testimony from the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.14  
The United States Supreme Court provided a definition of science 
drawn from the text of Rule 702 and carefully explained how this 
rule relates to the other evidentiary rules.15  The recent Federal 
Vaccine Court cases regarding the possible link between vaccines 
and autism provides another opportunity to assess the role of 
science in the law, which Professor Joëlle Moreno addresses in this 
issue.16  The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the Daubert 
approach in Goeb v. Tharaldson.17  In its opinion the Minnesota 
Supreme Court largely ignored the text of Minnesota Rule of 
Evidence 702, identical to the federal rule, except in 
acknowledging that the United States Supreme Court had relied on 
the text.18  The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that it did not 
have to address Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 because 
subsequent to the promulgation of Minnesota Rule of Evidence 
702 the court “transformed the standard for admissibility in 
Minnesota into the two prong Frye-Mack standard19 and reaffirmed 
adherence to Frye-Mack in State v. Schwartz.”20
 
 13. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
 14. Id. at 588. 
 15. Id. at 589–90. 
 16. See Joëlle Anne Moreno, It’s Just a Shot Away: MMR Vaccines and Autism and 
the End of the Daubertista Revolution, WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1511 (2009). 
 17. 615 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000).  
 18. Id. at 810. 
 19. Id. at 813–14. See also State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989); 
State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).  
 20. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 810. 
  In Mack, the court 
addressed the admissibility of novel scientific expert testimony, 
without a single reference to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702, 
effectively ignoring the rules of evidence.  In Schwartz, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the application of Minnesota 
Rule of Evidence 702, which the court referred to as a relevancy 
5
Thompson: Foreword
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
2009] FOREWORD 1363 
rule.  Rather than focusing on the rule, however, the court 
reasoned that the issue had already been decided in Mack. 
At best the Minnesota Supreme Court treats rules of evidence 
as general standards, not real rules constraining choices.  Thus, 
policy choices are retained by the court and not given to an 
advisory committee or rulemaking body.  But, as Hamilton warned, 
where there are no clear constraining rules, decision making can 
be ad hoc and inconsistent.21
Professor Sampsell-Jones recognizes this problem in the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s Rule 404(b) decisions, which he 
politely refers to as “not very sensible.”
  Of course this can lead to confusion, 
particularly if the court does not clearly articulate how its decisions 
deviate from the text and policy of the published rules. 
22  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s expansive approach to the admissibility of uncharged 
misconduct renders the text of the rules of evidence meaningless.  
In my view, Professor Sampsell-Jones strikes at the heart of the 
problem when he suggests the Minnesota Supreme Court is not 
entirely sold on a key value expressed in the text and policy of 
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404 that propensity evidence is to be 
avoided except in narrowly defined situations.  Notwithstanding the 
rules of evidence, which severely limit propensity evidence, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has never quite given up on the notion 
that the jury must be able to see the “whole person” when a 
defendant appears at trial.23
 
 21. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961).  “To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that 
they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define 
and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.”  Id.   
 22. See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Spriegl Evidence: Still Searching for a Principled Rule, 
35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1368 (2009). 
 23. The reference to seeing the whole person comes up in the context of 
admitting past convictions under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 609.  While the rule 
contemplates admitting only convictions that are probative on the issue of 
credibility as a witness, the court takes an expansive approach to admitting past 
convictions under a pre-rules theory that the jury should see the “whole person.”  
See State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 680 (Minn. 2007) (referring to pre-rules “whole 
person” concept and concluding that a conviction has impeachment value 
because it allows the jury to see the “whole person”); State v. Smith, 669 N.W.2d 
19, 29 (Minn. 2003) (using “whole person” concept to admit prior conviction).  
Professor Sampsell-Jones has also chronicled the Supreme Court’s flawed 
approach in applying Rule 609.  See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Minnesota’s Distortion of 
Rule 609, 31 HAMLINE. L. REV. 405 (2008). 
  Perhaps as recommended in the 
article, new legislation would constrain the court, but if the 
legislation did not conform to the court’s core value and abolish 
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the propensity rule, I am not hopeful we will find the “principled 
rule” we all should be seeking. 
Sugiska and Herr provide invaluable insight into specific 
evidentiary issues implicated by advances in electronic technology.24  
They note the Minnesota Court’s reluctance to change established 
rules to accommodate new issues and trust in the continued good 
judgment of the judiciary.  They do not recommend constraining 
judicial choices by promulgating new rules.  In their article they 
discuss one of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s few decisions on 
questions relating to authentication, Furlev Sales & Associates, Inc. v. 
North American Automotive Warehouse, Inc.25  In Furlev Sales the court 
ignored the Minnesota Rules of Evidence and imposed an 
elaborate, highly technical seven-part foundational test for the 
admissibility of tape recordings.  Requiring technical foundational 
elements26 is inconsistent with the text and spirit of Minnesota Rule 
of Evidence 901.27
Although the rules may not constrain the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, they likely affect the behavior of trial judges and may impact 
Minnesota citizens.  Professors Jesson and Knapp provide their 
scholarly take on legislation aimed at creating an evidentiary 
privilege for a statement of apology in the high-stakes medical 
malpractice arena.
  Again the court did not refer to or cite the 
applicable rule of evidence. 
28
 
 24. See Keiko L. Sugisaka & David F. Herr, Admissibility of E-Evidence in 
Minnesota: New Problems or Evidence as Usual?, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1453 (2009).  
 25. 325 N.W.2d 20, 28 n.9 (Minn. 1982). 
 26. One of the Furlev Sales requirements is that there must be a showing that 
the taped testimony was voluntary and made without any inducement.  Id.  This 
may or may not be an issue relating to admissibility in criminal cases, but it should 
not be included as a general requirement for admissibility of a tape recording. 
 27. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the Furlev Sales test while 
addressing the admissibility of taped telephone conversations.  See Turnage v. 
State, 708 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2006).  The court actually quoted the text of 
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 901(a), but it provided no analysis or any discussion 
about how the technical Furlev Sales requirements square with the text or policy of 
the rule.  Id. 
 28. See Lucinda E. Jesson & Peter B. Knapp, My Lawyer Told Me to Say I’m Sorry: 
Lawyers, Doctors, and Medical Apologies, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1410 (2009). 
  They note that thirty-five states have passed 
statutes providing some type of privilege in an attempt to 
encourage medical professionals to maximize the therapeutic value 
of the apology.  The statutes are intended to allow medical 
personnel the opportunity to express heartfelt regret, remorse, 
sympathy, or even responsibility for an adverse outcome without 
7
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fear of triggering a large malpractice suit or judgment. 
The authors fully document the therapeutic value of candid 
and honest doctor-patient communication following an adverse 
result.  They are concerned, however, that providing a legal 
statutory privilege will embroil the apology in the midst of the 
adversary process, and the apology will lose its therapeutic and risk 
management benefit.  They fear that apologies will cease to be a 
doctor’s honest expression and will be delivered, and, perhaps 
more important, be perceived as part of a risk management strategy 
to avoid litigation.  Apparently rules do matter. 
Of course rules matter, particularly if American citizens 
perceive that the rules are crafted in an unfair and one-sided 
manner.  Professor Hansen’s timely article critiquing the Military 
Commissions Process reminds us of core values shared by most 
Americans: the adjudication process should be designed to provide 
all parties a fair opportunity to contest their charges.29
Professors Scallen and Cribari address constitutional rules.
  The rules 
should be fair.  While in time of war, and under threat of terror, 
Americans may be willing to put greater trust in the Executive 
branch or the military.  But perhaps this trust was strained by the 
one-sided, seemingly unfair tribunals set up to try enemy 
combatants under the Military Commissions Act.  Hansen suggests 
that the traditional evidentiary rules applicable in American 
tribunals, and as codified in the Military Rules of Evidence, should 
not be casually cast aside.  Deviations from traditional evidentiary 
rules should be based on sound reasons, not unsupported 
assumptions or attempts to assure that the tribunal will return only 
guilty verdicts. 
30  
They discuss different aspects of the United States Supreme Court’s 
retake on the right to confrontation stemming from Crawford v. 
Washington.31  Cribari probes the analytical roots of the decision, 
which includes dicta suggesting that the right to confrontation is 
not applicable to preclude dying declarations.32
 
 29. See Victor Hansen, The Usefulness of a Negative Example: What We Can Learn 
About Evidence Rules From the Government’s Most Recent Efforts to Construct a Military-
Commission’s Process, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1480 (2009).  
 30. See Stephen J. Cribari, Is Death Different? Dying Declarations and the 
Confrontation Clause after Crawford, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1542 (2009); Eileen A. 
Scallen, Coping with Crawford: Confrontation of Children and other Challenging 
Witnesses, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1558 (2009). 
 31. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 32. Id. at 56 n.6.  
  The Minnesota 
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Supreme Court has already ruled on that point and, according to 
the Minnesota Court, the admissibility of dying declarations is not 
affected by the right of confrontation.33
Recently in Giles v. California,
  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court did not address the difficult policy questions identified by 
Cribari, but relied on stare decisis to justify the result.  Cribari 
makes the point that constitutional rulemaking can be complex in 
a pluralistic, multicultural society.  As Cribari points out, simple 
constitutional rules cannot make the world simple. 
The complexity of the “simple” new rule for confrontation 
rights is plumbed in Professor Scallen’s article on confrontation 
and forfeiture in domestic and child abuse cases.  Crawford has had 
its biggest impact in these cases.  Prior to Crawford the repeated 
experience of child or domestic abuse victims who were unable or 
unwilling to stand up and provide trial testimony against a parent, 
spouse or “loved one” had led to evidentiary innovations and 
relaxed applications to permit hearsay statements to be admitted at 
trial.  The simple rule in Crawford, that these testimonial statements 
are not admissible unless subject to cross-examination, may have 
had a devastating impact on prosecutions of abuse. 
34 the United States Supreme 
Court held that forfeiture of the Sixth Amendment right to 
confront must include a showing that the defendant’s actions were 
intended to prevent testimony or cooperation in criminal 
prosecutions.  Justice Scalia may have thrown a lifeline, or a way out 
of “simplistic rulings,” by suggesting that to prove forfeiture the 
court may consider “evidence that the abuse or threats were 
intended to dissuade the victim from resorting to outside help.”35
The articles in this issue confront current evidentiary issues in 
a number of different contexts.  An underlying premise of each 
 
 
 33. See State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 585–86 (Minn. 2005) (admitting 
shooting victim’s statement, “Call the police.  Jeff and Lenair.” as a dying 
declaration).  To the court’s credit the opinion includes both an analysis of 
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and a complete analysis of the Crawford 
opinion. On a related issue, the  Minnesota court’s conclusion that the Sixth 
Amendment provided some type of right to confrontation when facing non-
testimonial hearsay proved to be wrong.  Id. at 584.  See Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (stating that the right to confrontation was not applicable to 
non-testimonial statements), abrogation recognized by State v. Moua Her, 750 N.W.2d 
258, 265 n.5 (Minn. 2008). 
 34. 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).  The decision was inconsistent with an earlier 
Minnesota Supreme Court decision that was subsequently vacated.  See State v. 
Moua Her, 750 N.W.2d 258, vacated, Moua Her v. Minnesota, 129 S.Ct. 929 (2009). 
 35. Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2693. 
9
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article is that the choice of the evidentiary rule to be used in the 
trial is an important decision.  Evidence rules should not be 
applied on an ad hoc basis divorced from precedent, policy, text, 
and context.  Rather than impeding just results, evidence rules 
should consistently produce just results. 
 
10
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